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Abstract
Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter participation and political account-
ability. Randomized interventions were implemented nationwide during the 2009 Mozambi-
can elections using leaets, text messaging, and a free newspaper. We study the local peer
e¤ecs triggered by the campaign. We investigate whether treatment e¤ects are transmit-
ted through social networks and geographical proximity at the village level. For individuals
personally targeted by the campaign, we estimate the reinforcement e¤ect of proximity to
other individuals in our sample. For untargeted individuals, we estimate how the campaign
di¤uses as a function of proximity to others in the sample. We nd evidence for both e¤ects,
similar across treatments and proximity measures. The campaign raises the level of interest
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in the election through networks, in line with the average treatment e¤ect. However, we
nd a negative network e¤ect of the treatment on voter participation, implying that the
positive e¤ect of treatment on more central individuals is smaller. We interpret this result
as consistent with free-riding through pivotal reasoning and we provide additional evidence
to support this claim.
1. Introduction
The rationality of voter turnout in political elections is often questioned: unless a person casts the
deciding vote, voting has no e¤ect on the outcome (e.g., Feddersen, 2004 ). This is particularly
true in elections where one contender has widespread support and the outcome is fairly certain. If
no one votes, however, the electoral outcome is unlikely to reect the preferences of the electorate.
Not voting is therefore equivalent to free-riding on other peoples electoral participation. As a
consequence, voting is often seen as a civic duty. Although some countries (e.g., Belgium, Brazil,
Peru) make voting a legal obligation, most do not. The level of electoral participation therefore
depends on the probability that voters attribute to being pivotal and on the social norms that
are in place regarding voting. Peer inuence may a¤ect both.
The purpose of this paper is to study peer e¤ects in political participation. A randomized
control trial was organized in Mozambique to study the e¤ect of voter education during the
2009 elections. The study of voter education in developing countries has seen recent atten-
tion, as electoral problems like clientelism and vote-buying (Wantchekon, 2003 ; Fujiwara and
Wantchekon, 2013 ; Vicente, 2014 ), violence (Collier and Vicente, 2014 ), and low accountabil-
ity (Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su, 2011 ) have been identied to a¤ect the likelihood that
elections translate into public policies that produce broad-based development. In particular,
since the rst democratic elections in 1994, Mozambique has experienced a dramatic decrease
in political participation that has accompanied the consolidation of power of the ruling party.
The voter education campaign we study was implemented in collaboration with a free news-
paper and a consortium of local NGOs. Its main objective was to increase electoral participation.
Three di¤erent treatments were administered nationwide across four provinces. The rst is the
distribution of the free newspaper, which focuses on neutral information about the elections. The
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second is a text messaging hotline to which citizens can report electoral problems. The third
is civic education delivered via a leaet and text messages providing information about the
elections. All treatments include an appeal to voter participation in the elections. Treatments
were allocated randomly across locations. Within locations, a number of randomly selected
individuals were directly targeted by the campaign. We refer to them as targeted. We also
follow a randomly selected number of individuals who reside in treated locations but are not
directly targeted by the campaign. We refer to them as untargeted. Targeted and untargeted
individuals are always the head of household or his/her spouse.
Our focus is to estimate the within-village peer e¤ects of the intervention. Following Fafchamps
and Vicente (2013), we divide peer e¤ects into reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects. Reinforcement
refers to the e¤ect of the campaign for targeted individuals who are socially or geographically
proximate to other sampled individuals. Di¤usion refers to the e¤ect of the treatment on untar-
geted individuals in treated locations who are close to targeted individuals. Aker, Collier, and
Vicente (2016) study the direct average treatment e¤ect of the voter education campaign we
analyze in this paper. Their results are briey summarized here to enable comparability with
peer e¤ects.
In terms of outcomes variables, we exploit a rich individual dataset that includes survey
measures of individual turnout, a behavioral measure of political participation, and measures
of information and interest in politics. We also report average treatment e¤ects using o¢ cial
voting records at the polling station level. To estimate reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects, we
use detailed measures of social and geographic connectedness between individuals, including
measures of chatting, kinship and geographical distance between respondentshouses.
The intervention is found to increase voter turnout at the polling station level, as given
by o¢ cial records. Survey measurements show that turnout increases both among targeted and
untargeted individuals. We also report a clear increase in information about the elections among
targeted and untargeted individuals.
Reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects on voter participation are, however, quite di¤erent from
average treatment e¤ects as they are all negative. This holds for di¤erent measures of connected-
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ness, and for both voter turnout and our behavioral measure of political participation. Negative
reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects on turnout are particularly strong for the hotline treatment.
In contrast, peer e¤ects on information and interest in politics are positive and in line with
the average e¤ects of the campaign.
We interpret these ndings as consistent with a model of costly political participation. In
this framework, voter turnout may be induced either by the probability of a¤ecting the electoral
process, or by non-instrumental motivations like civic-mindedness. By giving information about
the credibility of the elections, the campaign intends to reassure voters about the integrity of the
process. So doing, it may also raise civic-mindedness. Both e¤ects are conducive to increased
turnout, in line with the average e¤ects of the campaign. However, peer e¤ects can induce a
reduction in turnout if central voters realize that, because of the campaign, turnout will increase
and their vote becomes less essential in achieving a politically acceptable electoral result.
Our estimation of network e¤ects in the context of a randomized eld experiment relates to
a recent body of work on the role of networks in aid interventions. Miguel and Kremer (2004)
launched this literature by estimating the externalities of a deworming school-based program
in Kenya. They estimated the impact of the treatment on control populations. Because their
experimental design features program randomization at the school level, it does not allow for an
experimental estimation of externalities within treated schools. More recently, Angelucci and
De Giorgi (2009) extend the study of externalities to a conditional cash transfer program. By
exploring a rich set of outcomes at the household level they are able to draw some light into
specic mechanisms of inuence of unexposed households. However, these authors do not use
explicit network variables. Still in the context of a conditional cash transfer program, Angelucci,
De Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010) introduce explicit interaction between households but focus
on kinship links. Our analysis of kinship as a measure of social interaction is also related to
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) who study technology adoption in Mozambique in a non-experimental
setting. Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and Ozler (2014) study the design of experiments intended
specically to analyze spillover e¤ects.
The experimental literature on voter mobilization was initiated by the studies of Alan Gerber
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and Donald Green. For instance, Gerber and Green (2000) studied the impact of a leaet get-
out-the-vote campaign in the U.S. Dale and Strauss (2009) introduce text messaging in American
get-out-the-vote campaigns and provide evidence that SMS reminders increased the likelihood of
voting. The studies by Nickerson (2008), Fafchamps and Vicente (2013), and Gine and Mansuri
(2011) relate closely to our paper as they analyze peer e¤ects of voter mobilization interventions.
The rst looks at a door-to-door get-out-the-vote campaign in the U.S. to identify peer-e¤ects
in two-member households. The second follows a campaign against political violence in Nigeria
to identify reinforcement and di¤usion network e¤ects. The third assesses the impact of a voter
awareness campaign on female turnout in Pakistan; peer e¤ects are estimated using geographical
distance and friendship.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the context of our experiment.
The treatments are introduced in detail in Section 3. Subsequently, in Section 4 we describe
the data, including outcome and network variables. In Section 5 we report on average e¤ects,
including balance tests. Peer e¤ects are presented in Section 6, together with robustness analysis.
In Section 7 we discuss various possible interpretations of our peer e¤ect estimates and we
introduce additional tests. Section 8 concludes.
2. Context
Mozambique, a country with 22.4 million inhabitants, is one of the poorest countries in the
world with GDP per capita of 838 USD in 2008 - it ranks 161st in 189 countries in terms of
GDP per capita. Without prominent natural resources, and with 81 percent of the population
involved in agriculture, it is an aid-dependent country with o¢ cial aid assistance accounting for
22 percent of GNI in 2008.1
Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975, after which the independence move-
ment FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) led a single-party socialist regime. Be-
ginning in 1977, Mozambique su¤ered a devastating civil war, fought between FRELIMO and
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). RENAMO was supported by Apartheid South
1These gures were taken from World Development Indicators, 2009, and CIA World Factbook, 2010.
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Africa and, in the context of the cold war, by the U.S. The civil war ended in 1992 with an
agreement to hold multi-party elections. Since then, presidential and parliamentary elections
have been held in Mozambique in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. FRELIMO and its spon-
sored presidential candidates won all national elections, with RENAMO as the main contender.
FRELIMO has increased its vote share over time, but voter turnout has decreased massively
from 88 percent in 1994 to just 36 percent in 2004.
Armando Guebuza became FRELIMOs leader and president in 2004, succeeding Joaquim
Chissano. Guebuza is a historical gure in FRELIMO. He fought against the Portuguese and was
minister of the interior under Samora Machel. He became a wealthy and powerful businessman
after the privatization of public companies in the 90s. In the 2009 election that we study he was
running for re-election as president of the country. His main opponent, Afonso Dhlakama has
been the leader of RENAMO since 1984. He served as guerilla leader during the civil war, and
has been RENAMOs presidential candidate in all national elections.
In this paper we focus on the presidential, parliamentary and provincial assembly elections
of October 28, 2009. The 2009 elections were relatively calm, with FRELIMO and Guebuza
expected to win. The elections were generally unproblematic, with national and international
observers considering that the 2009 election followed appropriate international standards, despite
many small irregularities. Electoral results attributed 75 percent of the vote to Guebuza at the
presidential elections, and to FRELIMO at the parliamentary elections.
3. Treatments
The data used in this paper come from a randomized controlled trial implemented around the
time of the 2009 elections. Three treatments are investigated, all geared towards encouraging
people to vote. The rst treatment is the distribution of an independent newspaper provid-
ing electoral information; the second is a campaign to encourage voters to use an SMS-based
hotline set up to report electoral problems; and the third is a civic education campaign that
provides information about the electoral process and focuses on participation in the elections.
The three interventions were designed and conducted with the institutional support and active
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collaboration of newspaper @Verdade (http://www.verdade.co.mz/) and of a consortium of eight
Mozambican NGOs, named Observatório Eleitoral. For more details on these organizations, see
Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2016).
Voter education campaigns generally combine one or more of three elements: (i) information
providing information about the electoral process; (ii) nudging repeatedly reminding people
to vote;2 and (iii) participation o¤ering voters the opportunity to circulate their observations
about the electoral process.
The newspaper treatment combines all three elements, i.e., information, nudging, and partic-
ipation. It centers on the distribution of the free newspaper @Verdade to experimental subjects
in selected locations. None of the locations in the experiment had received the newspaper
before.3 The editors of the newspaper took a strictly independent approach to the electoral
process, focusing their message on electoral education. The newspaper was distributed to se-
lected locations from the time of the baseline survey in September 2009 until the post-election
survey of November 2009. Over this period, the newspaper included information designed and
distributed by the electoral commission (CNE/STAE). This information focused on the voting
procedure during election day (see middle panel of Figure A1 in the Online Appendix). The
newspaper also advertised a national hotline for reporting electoral problems (see right panel
of Figure A1 ). For the distribution of the newspapers to treated villages, priority was given to
targeted respondents. 5,000 copies of the newspaper were distributed each week, with a total of
125 for each location.
The hotline treatment emphasizes primarily information and participation. Two short-code
phone numbers were contracted with the main cell phone operators in Mozambique (Mcel and
Vodacom). These short-codes were used to establish an SMS hotline inviting text messages
reporting electoral problems. This hotline was branded with a di¤erent slogan and used di¤erent
short-codes from the newspaper hotline. During the baseline survey, we conducted a door-to-
2See Dale and Strauss (2009) for an example of the e¤ects of text messaging nudges on voter turnout in 2006
American elections. The e¤ectiveness of nudging in other elds has also been documented (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008 ; Pop-Eleches et al., 2011 ).
3Despite being the highest circulation newspaper in Mozambique (with a minimum of 50,000 certied copies
per week), the newspaper was only systematically distributed in the city of Maputo. As all newspaper locations
lie outside the city of Maputo, they had never received the newspaper.
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door campaign providing information on the hotline: we distributed 10,000 leaets (250 per
location) primarily directed at targeted respondents. These leaets provided basic information
about the hotline, i.e., short-codes, examples/format of reports to be sent,4 and the name of the
sponsors. The leaet is depicted in Figure A2. Subjects were told that the contents of reports
would be passed to the media for dissemination, and shared via SMS with all other targeted
respondents in hotline treatment locations. Before being disseminated, each report received was
veried with local correspondents that were hired in each of the hotline treatment locations. In
addition to receiving these SMS reports throughout the electoral period, respondents in hotline
areas were also sent daily SMS reminders about the existence of the hotline. These reminders
were sent from two weeks prior to the election until election day.
The civic education treatment combines information and nudging elements. The intervention
was initiated by a door-to-door campaign during the baseline survey, approximately a month
before the elections. The treatment centers on the distribution of an extended version of the
information provided by CNE/STAE through the newspaper. It took the form of a leaet
designed and produced by CNE/STAE. A copy of the leaet is displayed in Figure A3. It
explains in detail the voting procedure on election day. 10,000 leaets were distributed (i.e.
250 per location) primarily to targeted respondents. Moreover, for two weeks prior to the
election, subjects in the civic education treatment received ve daily text messages on the
cell phone number that they provided during the baseline survey. The messages focused on
the importance of voter participation, as in a get-out-the-votecampaign. Within their 160-
character limit, these messages also provide specic information about the electoral process,
namely: the scheduled date; the type of election taking place; the presidential candidates; the
parties running for parliament; voter condentiality; and how to vote.5
All three treatments contain an information element encouraging subjects to vote. We
therefore expect all of them to have a positive e¤ect on turnout. The civic information treatment
has the strongest nudging component. If this treatment has a particularly strong e¤ect on
4Specically, ballot location name rst, and description of the problem second.
5The experimental protocol for the three treatments was specically that all targeted respondents were to be
given the newspaper and the leaets (for the hotline and civic education), and that no untargeted respondents
were to be given these materials.
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turnout, it suggests that nudging can e¤ectively induce people to vote. The hotline has the
strongest participation element. A large treatment e¤ect would suggest that turnout can be
increased by encouraging voter participation in the electoral process.
4. Data
The project took place in four provinces, Cabo Delgado, Zambezia, Gaza, and Maputo-Province.
The sampling base is the 2004 electoral map of the country, and the enumeration area or EA is the
area covered by a polling station. Because the use of cell phones is central to all our treatments,
we eliminate from the sampling base all polling locations without cell phone coverage. For
this purpose, we obtained detailed data from the two cell phone operators on the geographic
location of each of their antennae. These were then plotted on a map using their geographical
coordinates, with a ve-km coverage radius drawn around each. All polling stations outside the
covered area were dropped from the sampling base. In 2009, 60 percent of all polling stations
in the country were covered by at least one operator.
From this sampling base, 161 polling locations were selected using two-stage clustered rep-
resentative sampling rst on provinces, then on EAs. The number of registered voters per
polling location is used as sampling weight. Since all registered voters in the sampling frame
have the same probability of being sampled, the experimental locations are nationally represen-
tative of the voting population of Mozambique that has mobile phone coverage. The allocation
of locations to treatments and control follows a stratied randomization procedure (Bruhn and
McKenzie, 2009 ). First, clusters of four similar locations were formed in each province, with
similarity based on geography. Within each cluster, locations were then randomly assigned to
one of the three treatments or to control. During the baseline survey, in the event that we found
no cell phone coverage in a selected location, we replaced it by the closest polling location with
cell phone coverage. That happened in seven locations.6
In each of the EAs we conducted two face-to-face household surveys, one before the election
and treatment, and one after. Sampling in each EA followed standard procedures for household
6One control substitute location was sampled but found not to be needed. It was added to our sample but has
no impact on the results.
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representativeness (nth house call by enumerators starting from the polling station, typically a
school located at the center of the EA). Interviews at baseline were directed at the household
head or his/her spouse. Interview and subsequent treatment are conditional on having access
to a cell phonefor receiving and sending calls and messages. Respondents that do not own a
cell phone but have access to one via a neighbor or family member nearby are included in the
study. The baseline survey includes 1,766 households/respondents, approximately 11 per EA. It
took place from mid-September to mid-October 2009.
In treated EAs, individuals interviewed at baseline were randomly assigned to be targeted
or untargeted as follows. Of the average 11 baseline households interviewed in each treated
EA. Of these, two were randomly selected not to receive the treatment themselves. They are
called untargeted. The other nine, the targeted, were directly treated as described in the
previous section. This randomization was implemented specically to study di¤usion e¤ects
among individuals in treated locations not directly targeted for treatment.7
The post-election survey started after the election results were announced in early November.
It lasted for about the same duration as the baseline survey. We attempted to re-interview all
baseline respondents, and reached 1,154 of them.8 To check that our results are not an artifact of
selective attrition in the post-election survey, we verify, in the next section, whether observable
characteristics vary systematically across treatments.
4.1. Outcome variables
The outcomes of interest in this paper come mainly from survey and behavioral data collected
at the individual level. Table A1 in the Online Appendix presents a summary of the survey
outcome variables. These variables have been grouped into three sets: participation (turnout),
information, and interest in the elections. We also report o¢ cial voting results at polling stations.
7Note that the relatively low number of untargeted respondents in treated locations has implications for
relatively low statistical power to identify these di¤usion e¤ects.
8The post-election survey took place during the rainy season when most agricultural work (machambas)
occurs. As agricultural plots tend to be located at a fair distance from home (Sheldon, 1999; De Vletter, 2001 ),
agricultural workers often migrate during this season. In the survey, the most commonly reported reason for the
absence of an adult dependent is agricultural work. Non-farm work and travelling are also frequently reported
as reasons for absence in the Maputo province, probably because it is more urbanized and o¤ers more non-farm
employment opportunities (Cungara et al., 2011 ).
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We were particularly careful with the measurement of voter turnout. We constructed six
turnout measures. The rst one is self-reported turnout. The second is self-reported turnout
adjusted by considering as non-voters those who did not answer correctly questions regarding
ballot papers and boxes. The third one is an indicator of whether the respondent showed
without hesitation his/her index nger to the enumerator when asked about which nger was
marked after voting. Indeed, dipping the voters nger in indelible ink was the method used to
prevent people from voting multiple times. Turnout index 1 is a composite index incorporating
information on how well the respondent answered questions on the sequence of events during
the election day (including the one on the inked nger). The answer to each question is coded
according to how convincing the response is. Turnout index 2 is based on the sub-group of these
questions that focuses on knowledge about the polling station.9 The last measure of turnout
is an enumerator assessment on whether the respondent voted or not. The three last measures
take values between 0 and 7 and are thus potentially more informative. To facilitate comparison
with the other turnout measures, we normalize them by dividing by 7, so they too range from 0
to 1.10 In the paper, we focus on index 2, which is our preferred measure of individual turnout
because it includes the best factual adjustment to self-reported turnout allowed by our design.
Evidence for other measures of individual turnout is presented in the online appendix. We note
in passing that self-reported turnout is larger than all other turnout estimates. Overreporting is
consistent with voting being regarded as a civic duty: if respondents saw voting as a repressed
or reprehensible activity, we would expect the opposite pattern.
Our measure of electoral information is an index constructed from survey questions on: the
type of elections that took place in 2009; the duration of a presidential mandate; the lists of
presidential candidates and parties running for the 2009 elections; and the meaning of electoral
abstention. Answers given are marked as either correct or incorrect. Our measure of interest in
the elections is constructed from Likert scale questions on the interest that the respondent had
in: the presidential election, the parliamentary election, the election to provincial assemblies,
9These include correct answers on: the number of ballot papers; whether there were photos of the candidates;
the number of ballot boxes; whether they were transparent; whether they were colored; and whether the respondent
showed his/her index nger.
10The correlation between the di¤erent turnout measures ranges from 0.50, between the adjusted turnout and
the nger measure, to 0.98, between the self-reported turnout and index 1.
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and public matters more generally. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, we combine these
questions into two indices: one for information about the elections; and the other for interest in
the political process. The indices are constructed following the approach of Kling, Liebman and
Katz (2007): we normalize the survey-indicators using z-scores and we aggregate them using
equally weighted averages of the normalized individual variables. The z-scores are calculated
by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation.
As a result, each component of the index has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control
group.11
A behavioral indicator of demand for political accountability, which we refer to as the open
letter, is obtained as follows. During the post-election survey the enumeration team explained
and distributed a leaet to all survey respondents in all 161 experimental locations. This leaet
invited the respondent to send an SMS message proposing policy priorities to the president-
elect for his new mandate. We were clear in conveying the limited extent of the initiative (i.e.,
covering only a small number of experimental localities in Mozambique), and we promised that
the contents of these messages would reach the president in person (i.e., through the newspaper
@Verdade). As with the hotline, each message sent by an experimental subjects had a small
monetary cost. Sending the message therefore represents a costly action. The action of sending
such a message is observable to us by matching the cell phone number of the message sender
with that of the experimental subject recorded in the survey. We interpret sending such an
open letteras an incentive compatible indicator of demand for political accountability. The
leaet is depicted in Figure A4.
O¢ cial voting results at the level of the polling station were made available by the electoral
commission of Mozambique. Polling stations are easily matched with the EAs in our experiment
since, as mentioned earlier, EAs are based on the polling stations themselves. We focus on the
main results of the 2009 elections, i.e., the presidential and parliamentary elections.
11Like in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), if an individual has a valid response to at least one component
measure of an index, then we impute any missing values for other component measures at the random assignment
group mean for the corresponding time period.
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4.2. Network variables
We collected three measures of social and geographical centrality. The rst two are based on
degree centrality in social networks.12 Let i and j be two individuals in the selected sample of
targeted and untargeted participants in EA v and let the EA sample size be Nv+1. We ask each
i whether he/she can identify j by his or her name. If this is the case, we then ask i whether
he/she is related to j13 and whether he/she talks to j on a regular basis.14 We call the rst
type of social connection kinshipand the second chatting. Although kinship and chatting
should in principle be objective facts on which both i and j agree, answers given by respondents
i and j occasionally di¤er probably because some links are more salient to the respondent.
Since experimental subjects are more likely to be inuenced by peers that they regard as kin or
with whom they recall chatting, we dene the social network of individual i based only on the
answers they gave.
Formally, let gijv = 1 if i reported a social connection to j, and 0 otherwise. The social
network of i is thus dened as 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv where Nv is the number of respondents other than i in
EA v. Dividing by Nv serves to net out slight di¤erences in sample size across EAs. To illustrate,
suppose that gijv represents kinship. Then 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv is the proportion of participants in EA
v (other than i) that i reports as kin. Similarly, if gijv represents chatting, then 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv
is the proportion of participants in EA v (other than i) to whom i reports talking on a regular
basis.
The third variable captures how close i is to other individuals in the sample. Since the
sample is randomly selected, individuals who live close to the geographical center of the EA are
closer to other participants than individuals located at the outskirts of the EA. Geographical
centrality can thus be proxied by the (negative of the) average distance from i to others in the
12Because we only observe a fraction of the chatting and kinship networks, we refrain from using other measures
of centrality (e.g., Bonacich centrality) that are more sensitive to sample truncation bias (Chandrasekhar and
Lewis, 2012 ).
13The exact question used was Are the following individuals relatives of yours, i.e. members of your family?
Yes-No.
14The question asked was How frequently do you calmly chat about the day events with the following individuals
or members of their households? Not at all, sometimes, or frequently. We considered a link existed when the
individual answered sometimesor frequently.
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EA sample. Formally, let gijv be the physical distance between individuals i and j in EA v.15
The geographical centrality of i is dened as  1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv: the higher, i.e., less negative, this
number is, the more central is i. With these denitions, social centrality increases in each of the
measures and is normalized by the size of each EA sample.
5. Average treatment e¤ects
We begin by summarizing the average treatment e¤ects, some of which (though not all) already
appear in Aker, Collier and Vicente (2016). Peer e¤ects are presented in the next Section.
5.1. Testing strategy
The combined (i.e., direct and indirect) average e¤ect of the campaign is estimated as follows.
Let yiv be a measure of electoral behavior, information, or interest for individual i in village v.
Let Tv = 1 if village v was treated, and 0 otherwise. Assuming treatment is randomly assigned,
the homogeneous (average) e¤ect of the campaign on treated individuals can be estimated using
only targeted and control observations in a regression of the form:
yiv = + Tv + "iv (5.1)
Coe¢ cient  is the average treatment e¤ect on yiv e.g., electoral behavior, information, or
interest. This regression can also be estimated with village and individual controls, to check the
robustness of the ndings.
We also estimate the average e¤ect of the campaign on individuals in treated locations who
were randomly selected not to be targeted by the campaign. We estimate this average e¤ect
using only untargeted and control observations in a regression of the same form showed above.
Coe¢ cient  is then an estimate of the average di¤usion e¤ect of the campaign on the electoral
15Each enumerator was asked to locate each respondent on an approximate EA map, and to calculate the
distance between interviews. See Figure A5 for an example. To evaluate the position of each respondent on
the map, we construct up-down and left-right coordinates for each of them. The distance between each ij pair
is then calculated from these coordinates. Because maps di¤er in scale, distances are re-scaled to make them
comparable across all locations. This is accomplished by using the subset of pairwise distances, i.e., distance
between interviews, reported by enumerators.
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behavior, information, or interest of untargeted individuals. Estimations of (5.1) constitute the
focus of Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2016).
5.2. Balance
Before we show average treatment e¤ects, we check balance by treatment on the baseline data.
Tables A2 in the Online Appendix present descriptive statistics on demographic traits of the
baseline and post-elections samples together with balance tests. We test balance relative to
controls for each of the three treatments separately. Comparisons between treatment and con-
trol locations show that the samples are overall balanced. Regarding the sample of targeted
respondents at the baseline, only three demographic characteristics out of 35 are signicantly
di¤erent at the 10 percent level. For untargeted individuals, the number of signicant di¤er-
ences is reduced to two. The comparison between control and treated locations in the follow-up
survey yields a similar pattern: in both samples of targeted and untargeted respondents, most
household demographics are not signicantly di¤erent. Panel attrition seems to have maintained
comparability between the treatment groups in terms of observables. For EA characteristics,
we also only nd one statistically signicant di¤erence out of a list of ten variables across three
treatments.
Social and geographical centrality variables are summarized in Tables A3. The social cen-
trality variables, chatting and kinship, were collected during the post-election survey and so
we only display statistics for the post-election sample.16 We do not observe any statistically
signicant di¤erences across comparison groups.
Finally, we display averages for baseline voting variables at the polling station level. These are
voting records from the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004. Results are presented
in Table A4. We do not observe any statistically signicant di¤erences across comparison groups.
Individual outcome variables from the baseline survey are explored in full detail in Aker, Collier,
and Vicente (2016). Since respondents were asked questions on politics after receiving either
16As this information could only be collected during the post-elections survey, it raises the concern that the
treatments may have a¤ected the networks. The network measure chatting is the most vulnerable to this critique,
as it is possible that the interventions trigger conversations between people that ordinarily would not chat. The
network measures kinship and geographical distance are less likely to be susceptible to variations due to the
interventions.
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the leaets or the newspaper, there could be di¤erences across the targeted due to conformity
bias. No clear evidence of such e¤ects is apparent in the data, however.
5.3. Results
We start by summarizing the regression results estimating the average e¤ect of the campaign.
We begin with political participation, which is the main objective of the campaign. Table
1 presents the average e¤ect of the treatment on the voter turnout index and the sending
of the open letter, separately for targeted and untargeted individuals. The average e¤ect on
the remaining turnout measures is presented in Table A5 of the Online Appendix. Since by
design turnout information can only be collected in the post-election survey, all regressions
are estimated using post-election data only. For each measure we present one regression with
province dummies, and another with additional location and individual controls. All regressions
control for randomization group dummies and standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
The average value of the outcome variables for control individuals is reported in the middle
panel of Table 1. According to our turnout index, 76 percent of control respondents are estimated
to have voted in the 2009 election. This is higher than the 2009 national turnout average of 45
percent. The di¤erences is attributable to the fact that our respondents only include household
heads and their spouse. Turnout among adult dependents is notoriously lower (Vaz 2013).
Regarding the open letter, 15.3 percent of control individuals sent an SMS to the president
through our project.
We see from Table 1 that the average treatment e¤ect of the campaign on turnout is statisti-
cally signicant for both targeted and untargeted individuals. Given that the participation rate
is already high among control respondents, the magnitude of the e¤ect is large: plus between
6.9 and 9.7 percentage points, depending on the regression. If we estimate a pooled regression
with targeted and untargeted subjects, we nd no signicant di¤erence in average treatment
e¤ect (p-values of 0.785 and 0.817). Among targeted individuals, the average treatment e¤ect
of the newspaper and civic education treatments are smaller in magnitude, but not signicantly
so. There is also no statistical di¤erences with untargeted individuals.
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For the open letter, we nd an increase in the probability of sending a message to the president
for subjects in the newspaper and civic education treatments only. The magnitude of the e¤ect
is large: +11.0 and +7.8 percentage points, respectively, from a base of 15.1 percent. The
increase is statistically signicant for targeted individuals, but we cannot reject the hypothesis
that untargeted individuals exhibit a similar increase. There is no signicant e¤ect for the
hotline treatment, possibly because subjects in that treatment already have an opportunity to
express themselves via SMS through that treatment itself.
Next we turn to the average treatment e¤ect on information and interest in politics. Since
in both cases the dependent variable is a normalized index with mean zero and unitary variance
among controls, coe¢ cients are measured in standard deviation units of the underlying index.
The results are displayed in Table 2. As anticipated given the informational nature of the
campaign, we nd a signicant positive treatment e¤ect on the ability of targeted and untargeted
respondents to answer basic questions about the elections. The e¤ect is large in magnitude: it
ranges between 0.16 and 0.19 standard deviation units for the targeted, and between 0.20 and
0.28 standard deviation units for the untargeted. Point estimates are in general lower for the
newspaper and civic education treatments, but the di¤erence with the hotline treatment is never
statistically signicant. Regarding the e¤ect of treatment on interest in politics, we nd non-
negligible positive point estimates for both targeted and untargeted. But only one of these point
estimates is (marginally) signicant.
Finally, we summarize in Table 3 the average treatment e¤ect on actual electoral outcomes
from o¢ cial polling station records (see Aker, Collier, and Vicente, 2016 ). All treatments have a
strong and signicant positive e¤ect on voter turnout. This e¤ect ranges between 5.1 percentage
points for the presidential election and 5.4 percentage points for the parliamentary election, with
hardly any di¤erence across treatments. On voting patterns, we nd positive point estimates
on voting for the incumbent president (Guebuza) and party (FRELIMO), and negative point
estimates on voting for the main challenger candidate (Dhlakama) and party (RENAMO). As
seen in the Table, this is particularly true for the newspaper and civic education treatments.
If we separately estimate the average treatment e¤ect of the newspaper and civic education
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treatments, we nd that the latter is statistically signicant in all four voting regressions. The
e¤ect is large: it increases the score of FRELIMO and the incumbent president by 3.3 and 4.1
percentage points, respectively; and it reduces votes for RENAMO and its presidential candidate
by 3.4 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively.
To summarize, the campaign improved basic information about the electoral process and
increased voter turnout which was its objective. But it also beneted the incumbent and hurt
the chances of the main challenger signicantly so for the civic education treatment.
6. Peer e¤ects
6.1. Testing strategy
Drawing inspiration from Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) who analyze the peer e¤ects of a
campaign against electoral violence in Nigeria, we now investigate the role that peer e¤ects
played in the average treatment e¤ects reported so far. We rst examine whether the e¤ect
of the campaign is stronger for targeted individuals who are socially or geographically close to
other individuals in treated EAs. We estimate a reinforcement e¤ect model of the form:
yiv = + Tv + 
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + Tv
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + "iv; (6.1)
for which we use observations from targeted and control individuals only, i.e., we exclude untar-
geted individuals living in treated EAs. Regressor 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv is included as control variable
to capture the e¤ect that network centrality has on yiv in the absence of treatment: coe¢ cient
 measures the predictive e¤ect of social or geographical centrality on yiv. The main coe¢ cient
of interest is .17 It captures how the e¤ect of a treatment varies with social or geographical
proximity to others in the same EA.18
We also investigate the presence of di¤usion e¤ects using the same specication but compar-
17As is well known, when estimating regression (6.1), the coe¢ cient of the treatment variable  is mechanically
a¤ected when we add any regressor interacted with treatment Tv. To ensure comparability with ATE estimates
reported earlier, we express 1
Nv
P
j 6=i gijv in deviation from its sample mean. This method leaves  una¤ected,
but ensures that  still estimates the ATE. This approach is followed throughout this section, i.e., all regressors
interacted with Tv are always demeaned.
18 In the event that  = 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that social network e¤ects are so strong as to
spread evenly to all individuals in treated villages, in which case proximity to treated individuals does not matter.
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ing untargeted to control individuals only, i.e., excluding targeted individuals living in treated
EAs. Interpretation is similar to that of reinforcement e¤ects.
Based on earlier studies, we expect that  > 0: social links and geographical proximity
are anticipated to magnify the e¤ect of treatment  e.g., because the information content of
treatment spreads more readily to central nodes and thus leads to a stronger impact of treatment.
However, we cannot rule out a priori that  < 0, which would imply that peer e¤ects are strategic
substitutes rather than strategic complements. In this case, the treatment increase yiv (as shown
in Tables 1 and 2) but less so for more central individuals. This could arise if behavior yiv is
benecial for the group but individually costly, and central individuals free-ride on the e¤ect
that treatment has on others. We revisit this point more in detail later.
We use ordinary least squares in all our main regressions. Since the data we use is stratied
by EA, we allow for within-group dependence by clustering standard errors at the EA level.
6.2. Peer e¤ects on political participation
We rst apply the above testing strategy to our main focus of interest, namely political par-
ticipation measured by the turnout index and the open letter. Results are shown in Table 4.
We employ the three centrality variables introduced earlier: chatting, kinship, and geographic
proximity. Estimated reinforcement e¤ects are displayed in columns (1)-(3); network di¤usion
e¤ects are displayed in columns (4)-(6). We control for randomization group dummies, provin-
cial dummies, EA characteristics, and individual controls. The main focus is on the  and 
coe¢ cients in specication (6.1).
Regarding , we note that more central individuals have a higher turnout propensity in
control EAs: estimated coe¢ cients for 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv are strongly positive. This particularly
strong when using chatting and kinship as centrality measure, but also when using geographical
proximity. This means that, without treatment, individuals who are more central in their
community are more likely to vote. From these results alone, we cannot tell whether centrality
causes people to be more civic-minded e.g., because of social pressure or internalized norms 
or whether more civic-minded people become more central e.g., because they are more sociable.
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Turning to the interaction coe¢ cients , we nd that they are negative for the targeted and
untargeted and for all centrality measures though only statistically signicant for chatting and
kinship. Negative peer e¤ects are particularly strong for the hotline treatment, less so for the
civic education and newspaper treatments.
To get a sense of the magnitude of peer e¤ects, we calculate in the second panel of Ta-
ble 4 the di¤erence in predicted turnout between a treated subject with the average value of
1
Nv
P
j 6=i gijv and one with either very central or not central at all. More specically, tor chatting
and kinship, the comparison is with a treated subject with no connections, i.e., gijv = 0 for all
j. A negative value means that moving from no connections to average centrality decreases
the probability of voting induced by treatment. For geographical proximity, the comparison is
between a hypothetical treated subject at distance 0 to others in the EA (i.e., most central), and
a treated subject at the average distance. A negative value indicates that moving from being at
the average distance from others to being maximally central reduces the probability of voting
induced by treatment. The p-values are the same as those for the interaction coe¢ cients.
We see that the magnitude of peer e¤ects is large: relative to a hypothetical targeted subject
with no peers, the e¤ect of treatment on the turnout of a targeted subject with the average
social network is 4.9 and 2.7 percentage point smaller for the chatting and kinship networks,
respectively. This is equivalent to a shrinkage of the average treatment e¤ect by 68 and 40
percent, respectively. For untargeted subjects, the reduction in treatment e¤ect is even larger.
With geographical proximity, point estimates are di¤erent in size but the proximity variable
takes a wider range of values. If we look at the bottom panel of Table 4, we nd a large reduction
in treatment e¤ect between an individual with average centrality, and a maximally central
individual. Although this reduction is not statistically signicant for the hotline treatment,
it is signicant for the newspaper treatment among the untargeted. These results show that
the ATE hides large variation across subjects depending on their geographical and network
centrality: more central individuals experience a much smaller  and occasionally negative 
e¤ect of treatment on their propensity to vote. Similar results obtain if we use alternative
turnout measures. Detailed results are presented in Table A6 in the online appendix. Signicant
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e¤ects are all negative.19 In online appendix Table A6b we perform the same calculations as we
did in second panel of Table 4. They conrm that the magnitude of the network e¤ects is large
relative to the average treatment e¤ect.
Our preferred explanation for the negative network e¤ects is free-riding through pivotal
reasoning: more central individuals are in a better position to realize, due to their centrality in
the local network, that others are more likely to vote because of the campaign. They may also
realize that the gap between the incumbent and other candidates is likely to increase. Hence
their own electoral participation is less necessary to achieve a su¢ cient win gap to remain in
the good favors of the government. Hence the likelihood that they turn out to vote decreases.
We explore this and other explanations for negative peer e¤ects more in detail in the nal
section of this paper.
Results for the open letter are displayed in Table 5. As in Table 1 we nd no peer e¤ect
of the hotline treatment on sending the open letter  probably for the same reason, i.e., the
ability of the hotline participants to send SMS to others serves as a substitute for an SMS to the
president. If we examine each treatment separately, however, we nd that when we use chatting
or kinship as measure of social proximity, reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects are negative and
occasionally statistically signicant for the civic education treatment. Here too the magnitude
of this e¤ects is large relative to the ATE. For instance, a subject targeted by the civic education
treatment is 0:8 + 2:3 = 3:1 percentage point less likely to send the open letter if he/she has the
average kinship network than if he/she has no kinship network at all. For untargeted subjects,
the reduction is 12:0   2:6 = 9:4 percentage points. The potentially explanation may be the
same as for voter turnout: individuals with a large network realize others will send an open
letter as a result of treatment, and feel that their participation is less essential.
6.3. Peer e¤ects on information and interest in politics
We now seek to identify the channels through which the treatments a¤ected political partici-
pation. We have already noted that the treatments had a direct positive e¤ect on information
19We also estimated average treatment e¤ects for the samples of targeted and untargeted individuals split into
the 40 percent above the mean centrality and the 60 percent below the mean centrality. The ndings described
here are conrmed.
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about elections among targeted and untargeted individuals. But we could not nd a statistically
signicant treatment e¤ect on interest in politics. We now examine reinforcement and di¤usion
e¤ects on information and interest in politics. We want to know whether information and inter-
est are transmitted socially or geographically, and, if yes, whether the e¤ects are negative as was
the case for political participation. Regression model (6.1) is the same as before. All regressions
are estimated using post-election data. As before we control for randomization cluster xed
e¤ects, provincial dummies, EA characteristics, and individual characteristics.
Table 6 shows the results for information about the elections. We nd large positive peer
e¤ects on the targeted, but only one is statistically signicant (kinship). Unlike in the case of
political participation, we do not see signicant negative network e¤ects, and the largest of these
e¤ects in absolute value are positive. Nonetheless, there is also a great deal of variation in peer
e¤ects across treatments and centrality measures, and some of these di¤erences are statistically
signicant, so we should be careful not to over-generalize.
Results for interest in politics are presented in Table 7. We nd large positive peer e¤ects
on the targeted and untargeted for at least some of the treatments. The most robust peer
e¤ects are found for the newspaper treatment. Results indicate that chatting, kinship, and
geographical proximity are all channels for reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects. When estimated
individually, almost all peer e¤ects of the newspaper treatment are statistically signicant, a
majority of which at the 1 percent level. As for Tables 4, 5, and 6, we report in the second panel
of Table 7 estimates of the magnitude of network e¤ects. For the newspaper treatment, we see
that, relative to someone with no chatting links, a subject with an average chatting centrality
is 0:118 + 0:089 = 0:207 (reinforcement) or 0:017 + :279 = 0:296 (di¤usion) standard deviation
units more interested in elections. For kinship, the corresponding gures are 0.111 and 0.184.
The success of the newspaper in raising interest in the elections suggests that the copies of
the free newspaper @Verdade that we left in the treated villages found their way into multiple
hands. We nd lower reinforcement e¤ects for the hotline and civic education treatments, which
by nature are more targeted towards individual subjects.
To summarize, direct treatment e¤ects and network e¤ects on information and interest in
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elections are generally positive although the direct treatment e¤ects on interest in politics and
the network e¤ects on information about politics are not statistically signicant. The ndings
suggest that interest in politics is transmitted across networks, possibly because transmission of
the newspaper across peers does not entail large costs.
6.4. Robustness checks
Although balance tests do not indicate that panel attrition signicantly a¤ects the comparability
of treatment and control groups, we nevertheless test how sensitive our results are to missing
post-election observations. We use the multiple imputation method to replace the missing values
of outcome and control variables; and we re-estimate the average and network e¤ects on political
participation using the full sample of baseline respondents. Multivariate normal regressions are
used.20 In the imputation model, we include the variables that we use in our empirical analysis,
plus other characteristics of the household and of the respondents, characteristics of the EA, and
interactions between the interventions and characteristics of the household and respondents.
Recalculated estimates of the average treatment e¤ects on political participation are similar
to the ones obtained earlier. In Table A7 in the Online Appendix we present the average e¤ect
of each of the three treatments on the political participation of targeted respondents. This table
is to be compared with Table 1. We nd a very similar pattern of signicant e¤ects, particularly
for the results on average di¤usion among untargeted respondents.
For networks interacted with the treatment e¤ects, the coe¢ cients remain negative for most
treatments and network measures. We nd a similar pattern of signicant results, although with
a smaller magnitude. Table A8 displays the estimates of interaction e¤ects on the turnout index
variable using imputed data. Comparing these results with the ones observed in Table 4 we see
that almost all of the signicant network e¤ects remain, although they have smaller magnitudes.
The same can be said when we estimate the interaction terms for other turnout measures using
imputed data (Table A9 ) and compare them to the original results (Table A6 ). Overall, we
20Given than most variables are categorical, we considered using chained equations. However, it was very
di¢ cult to nd a model that would include all the relevant variables and converge. Schafer and Graham (2002)
argue that normal imputation models have a good performance for linear regressions, even when the variables are
non-normal.
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conclude that using multiple imputation to correct for attrition corroborates our ndings.
We also estimate two complementary models of the form:
yiv = 1 + 1Tv + 1
1
NTARGv
X
j 6=i;j2TARG
gijv + 1Tv
1
NTARGv
X
j 6=i;j2TARG
gijv + "iv (6.2)
yiv = 2 + 2Tv + 2
1
NUNTARGv
X
j 6=i;j2UNTARG
gijv + 2Tv
1
NUNTARGv
X
j 6=i;j2UNTARG
gijv + "iv
(6.3)
where TARG and UNTARG refer to targeted and untargeted groups of individuals. We apply
the above regression models to both reinforcement and di¤usion. If peer e¤ects occur solely
through proximity to targeted individuals, we should observe 1 6= 0 and 2 = 0. In this
particular conguration, regression model (6.3) can then be seen as a falsication test of (6.2).
In contrast, if 1 and 2 are similar in magnitude and signicance, we should conclude that
1 and 2 capture systematic variation in the e¤ect of treatment on central and non-central
individuals, irrespective of whether they are close to targeted or untargeted individuals.
Estimates for these models are presented in Table A10 in the Online Appendix. We do not
nd strong evidence that 1 and 2 coe¢ cients vary systematically. If anything, we obtain many
signicant 2 estimates in spite of the fact that the number of untargeted individuals in each EA
is much smaller than the number of targeted individuals and hence power should be smaller
in regression model (6.3). From this we conclude that the benchmark model we have estimated
is the most informative for the data we have collected.
7. Discussion
In order to assess the external validity of our ndings, we need some understanding of the
channels by which treatments a¤ect outcomes. To this purpose, we look for a coherent narrative
that can account for the whole body of evidence that we have gathered, with a particular focus
on turnout which is our main outcome of interest. After a detailed examination of the evidence
which is presented in Appendix one empirical nding stands out because it contradicts all
standard models of political inuence: negative reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects could not
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arise if peer e¤ects were due to either information di¤usion, inamed partisanship, or social
pressure to vote. All these predict positive peer e¤ects of treatment. To account for negative
peer e¤ects, a new conceptual framework is needed that can account for this nding. To this we
now turn.
7.1. Conceptual framework
To articulate  and check the internal consistency of  our proposed narrative, we introduce
a model of voter participation combining several of the features discussed in the literature.
The focus is on turnout.21 We start by making sure that our model incorporates the implicit
belief underlying our treatment: namely, that an educational campaign about elections raises
the information level of voters; this a¤ects their belief in the fairness and transparency of the
electoral process; their interest in the voting process rises as a result; and people increase turnout
to reect their heightened level of information and interest. This causal chain naturally extends
to the di¤usion of treatment to individuals untargeted by the campaign, and for reinforcement
e¤ects among the targeted  i.e., as information circulates among people, interest in elections
rises, and turnout increases.
To formalize this general idea in a compact manner, we build on the numerous sources sum-
marized by Dhillon and Peralta (2002) and Feddersen (2004). Let us assume that an individual
i decides a political participation vector xi (e.g., casting a vote, sending text messages with
political content) to maximize a payo¤ function:
max
xi
E
iU(G(xi; x i); xi)  C(xi) (7.1)
where G(xi; x i) is the outcome of the electoral process, x i is the combined action of individuals
other than i, 
 denotes is information set, and C(xi) is the total material cost of the action
for individual i (e.g., transport cost, opportunity cost of time, cost of text messaging). To
capture non-instrumental motivations we allow xi to enter the function U independently from
the outcome of the voting process G.
21Other forms of political participation such as the open letter follow the same logic.
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The rst order condition
E
i

@U
@G
@G
@xi
+
@U
@xi

=
dC
dxi
illustrates how a voter education campaign can inuence turnout. First, the campaign can
change voters information set 
i. Distributing information about the electoral process may
convince voters of the integrity of the electoral process, thereby raising E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
i
. Second,
the campaign may increase the non-instrumental motivation @U=@xi either through a support-
your-teame¤ect or by raising civic-mindedness. All these e¤ects increase voter participation.
Well-known conceptual di¢ culties arise when non-instrumental motivations are absent, i.e.,
when @U@xi = 0. Optimal turnout then requires E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
i
= dCdxi . When a single vote has little
e¤ect on the electoral outcome, as is conceivable for large elections, then @G(xi; x i)=@xi is small
and voting is not individually rational unless the marginal cost of participation is close to zero.
This paradox dates back at least to Downs (1957).22 Introducing non-instrumental motives for
voting alleviates the problem: the rst order condition E
i
h
@U
@xi
i
= dCdxi can be satised for an
interior xi even when E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
i
= 0.
The implicit assumption that motivates our treatments is that circulating information af-
fects votersinformation set 
i and, so doing, increases E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
+ @U@xi
i
and induces higher
turnout. The model shows that information can increase turnout in two ways: by increasing
the probability that is vote is pivotal (E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
i
); and by strengthening is non-instrumental
motivation for voting (E
i
h
@U
@xi
i
). The model also shows that more information can reduce
turnout if it lowers the probability of being pivotal, i.e., if it lowers E
i
h
@U
@G
@G
@xi
i
. For instance,
a citizen may decide not to vote if he/she learns that his/her preferred politician is guaranteed
to be elected.
Being pivotal is usually understood as inuencing who wins the election. This denition
makes sense in advanced democracies. Voters in other countries may care about other electoral
22A lively debate has followed. Using a game-theoretic voting game with two candidates, Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1983) nd a high turnout equilibrium generated by a high probability of being pivotal. This stems from having
nearly identical numbers of voters supporting each candidate. This result was short-lived: the same authors
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985 ) demonstrate that the introduction of incomplete information and a large population
eliminates the possibility that high turnout arises in equilibrium. Recently, Myatt (2015) recovered the idea that
@G(xi; x i)=@xi depends on the perceived competitiveness of the election. Myatt considers a two-candidate
election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate. Crucially, Myatt nds
that turnout is high under reasonable conditions.
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outcomes, such the turnout or win gap. This is particularly true in electoral autocracies where
the winner of the election is often known in advance, and where a low turnout or win gap is seen as
disapproving of the government. Political disapproval can be punished through various means,
including a lower supply of local public goods. In such political environment, being pivotal
does not mean casting the ballot that determines who wins the election; it means bringing the
turnout or win gap above the threshold below which the community faces reprisals. Some prima
facie support for this approach can be found in our data: the treatment increased turnout by
individuals who voted for the incumbent party (see Table 3).
In the traditional meaning of pivotal voter, the deciding ballot is a precisely dened concept;
the only uncertainty is about whether {s vote is decisive. This limits the range of beliefs
consistent with voting (e.g., Myatt, 2015 ). In contrast, a pivot based on turnout or win gap is
subject to additional uncertainty regarding the minimum level needed to avoid political reprisal.
This implies that the proportion of voters who can rationally believe to be pivotal is larger. The
pivotal logic remains, however: i is more (less) likely to vote if i receives information that raises
(lowers) the likelihood of being pivotal.23
Pivotal reasoning predicts that an information treatment changes the turnout level depending
on location-specic beliefs about turnout or win gap. In EAs where one party won the 2004
election by a large margin, voters may rationally expect the win gap to be large in 2009 as well
and thus may have a lower expectation of being pivotal. These beliefs are of course victim to
a fallacy of composition, which some voters may realize as a consequence of treatment. We test
this prediction in Table 8. Results reported in the rst column conrm that control EAs where
the win gap was large in 2004 experience a signicantly lower turnout in 2009. We also observe
a signicant positive interaction between the treatment and the 2004 win gap: the campaign
reduces the drop in turnout relative to control locations in EAs with larger win gaps. The second
column of Table 8 replaces the 2004 win gap with the 2004 voter turnout. The e¤ect is not
signicant, suggesting that voters care mainly about the win gap.
23The pivotal logic can take an instrumental interpretation at the individual level. But it can also work at the
collective level: since reaching a target turnout or win gap generates a local public good, voting can be regarded
as contributing to that public good. Social pressure can then be applied to induce individual contributions so
that the collective target is reached.
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Pivotal reasoning implies that an information treatment can a¤ect people di¤erently depend-
ing on how aware they are about othersturnout intentions. To illustrate, take N + 1 voters
arranged in a star shaped network. The center of the star represents a subject who is more
central in a social or geographical sense. Let us assume that each voter observes the voting
intentions of its immediate neighbor. The star center thus observes the voting intentions of the
N other voters who, in contrast, only observe the intention of the star center. The impact of
the treatments in this network (assuming for simplicity that all nodes are targeted) depends on
whether each node believes to be pivotal. If the star center is more aware of the positive average
e¤ects of the campaign on the win gap, he/she is less likely to believe being pivotal than the
spokes believe themselves to be.24 Hence, free-riding through pivotal reasoning implies that the
treatment should result in a lower turnout propensity for the star center than for spoke voters.
7.2. Empirical verication
This prediction is at prima facie consistent with our ndings. In control EAs, subjects that
are more central are more likely to vote  possibly because they realize that the large 2004
win gap has disincentivized spoke voters to turn out. This pattern is by and large reversed in
treated EAs: treatment induces the average voter to turn up to vote, and possibly as a result,
well-informed central subjects need not increase their own turnout as much as in control EAs.
Since we have information on voting by peers, we can directly investigate a key prediction of
pivotal reasoning: citizens who realize many of their social or geographical neighbors are likely
to vote may decide not to vote, i.e., voting is a strategic substitute. Put di¤erently, pivotal
reasoning predicts a negative relationship between my decision to vote and turnout among my
peers. It is important to realize that we are not trying to ascribe causality. We just test whether
my turnout is negatively correlated with the turnout of my peers: if more of them turn up to
vote, am I less likely to vote; and vice versa.
24This example can easily be generalized as follows. Let Niv be the subset of other voters that i observes in
village v, and N iv be the rest. Let Tv denote treatments as before. We have xv =
P
j2Niv xj +
P
j2N iv xj
and
@E
i [xv ]
@Tv
= Niv
Nv
E
i
h
@xj
@Tv
i
, as the observed change in behavior. Since the e¤ect of treatment on turnout is
positive, i.e., @xj
@Tv
> 0, it follows that individuals with a larger Niv increase their expectation E
i [xv] more than
people with a small Niv. Hence they are less likely to see themselves are pivotal, and thus to vote.
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To investigate this possibility, we estimate a model of the form:25
yiv = + 
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijvyjv + 
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijvTjv + 
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + v + "iv: (7.2)
where yjv is the turnout index of individual j and Tjv = 1 if peer j was targeted for treatment.
Regression (7.2) is estimated with EA xed e¤ects v as well as individual controls. EA treat-
ment e¤ects are omitted since they are subsumed in the EA xed e¤ects. We estimate (7.2)
using targeted and untargeted respondents, with a dummy for untargeted respondents. Pivotal
reasoning/strategic substitution in turnout predict  < 0: conditional on my peers having been
targeted for treatment, my own turnout is negatively correlated with my peersturnout since, if
they vote, I do not need to vote, and vice versa. In contrast, strategic complements in turnout
(e.g., due to information di¤usion, inamed partisanship, or social pressure to vote) predicts
 > 0. In either case, we are not interpreting  as causal we regard it as a correlation in
behavior predicted to arise in equilibrium.
Results are presented in Table 9. In columns (1) and (2), the regressor of interest is the
average turnout index of my peers  the more of them voted, the larger the regressor is. In
column (3), the regressor of interest is the average turnout of other villagers, weighted by their
distance to me. We see that in all three cases, individual i is less likely to vote if more of
his/her neighbors voted. The correlation is large in magnitude and statistically signicant.
This evidence suggests that voting choices of social and geographical neighbors are strategic
substitutes. Since this prediction comes out of pivotal reasoning but not from other models of
peer e¤ects in voting decisions, the evidence presented in Table 9 supports the idea that pivotal
reasoning is behind the negative peer e¤ects of treatment found in our experiment.
25Given our experimental design, it is in principle possible to estimate endogenous and exogenous peer e¤ects
simultaneously by using the treatment of is neighbors as instrument for the behavior of is neighbors (see Bra-
moullé, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009 ). We tried this approach as well. Unfortunately the small sample size in each
location precluded this approach: because of overlap in distance-2 neighborhoods, there is not enough variation
in the instrument to identify endogenous and exogenous e¤ects separately.
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7.3. Pivotal reasoning vs. saturation
Before concluding, we perform one last test of the relevance of the interpretation we have o¤ered
for our ndings. Demonstrating that treatment can reduce turnout among central subjects due
to pivotal reasoning is not the same as showing that it is behind our result. There may be other
explanations. One possibility we would like to rule out is that the negative coe¢ cient of the
Tv
1
Nv
P
j 6=i gijv term reects a voter saturation e¤ect rather than pivotal reasoning.
Because individuals with a larger social network vote with a high probability on average,
it may be more di¢ cult for them to further increase their likelihood of voting. This, and not
pivotal reasoning, could explain why the e¤ect of the treatment on these individuals is weaker
than on individuals with a smaller social network. To show this formally, let Piv represent
individual is propensity to vote in village v in the absence of treatment. We now assume that
voter turnout among the targeted follows the following model:
yiv = Piv + Tv + Tv
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + PivTv + "iv (7.3)
where  captures pivotal reasoning as before, and a signicantly negative  coe¢ cient indicates
voter saturation. A bias in the previous estimation of  arises if Piv is correlated with network
size 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv. To demonstrate this, let Piv = + 
1
Nv
P
j 6=i gijv and replace Piv in (7.3):
yiv = + 
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gij + ( + )Tv + ( + )Tv
1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + "iv (7.4)
Comparing (7.4) with (6.1) it is immediately apparent that voter saturation a negative  
can be misinterpreted as pivotal reasoning a negative  when estimating regression (6.1).
The solution we propose is to estimate bPiv using individuals in untreated locations and use it
as a control function to obtain separate estimates of  and . We obtain bPiv using only control
individuals, by regressing turnout on network size 1Nv
P
j 6=i gijv, individual controls, province
dummies, and EA characteristics. Because treatment is assigned randomly, bPiv is a consistent
predictor of treated individualspropensity to vote in the absence of treatment. We can also
estimate the average treatment e¤ect b in the usual way, e.g., as in Table 1. We then estimate
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(7.3) on targeted individuals using bPiv in lieu of Piv and b in lieu of . Since by design Ti = 1
for the targeted, the estimated regression boils down to:26
yiv   b = (1 + ) bPiv +  1
Nv
X
j 6=i
gijv + "iv (7.5)
Voter saturation  < 0 requires that the coe¢ cient of bPi be less than 1. Coe¢ cient  in regression
(7.5) is estimated free of voter saturation bias. Note that regression (7.5) has no intercept, which
in this case o¤ers the advantage of minimizing attenuation bias due to prediction error in bPi.
Since regression (7.5) includes two predicted regressors, bPiv and b, we rely on bootstrapping
to obtain consistent standard errors. To cluster standard errors as the EA level, bootstrapping
is conducted by sampling EAs with replacement to construct each simulated sample. Each
bootstrap iteration rst re-estimates bPiv and b and on the simulated data, and then uses them
to run (7.5) on that same data. Standard errors are obtained from the simulated distribution of
 and  across 500 bootstrap replications. Here we pool targeted and untargeted respondents
to increase power.
Point estimates are presented in Table 10, together with a test that the coe¢ cient of bPiv
is di¤erent from one. We see that, for the chatting and kinship networks, the coe¢ cient ofbPiv is marginally above 1 and is not signicantly di¤erent from 1. The network coe¢ cient 
remains negative, even if it is not precisely identied. We can thus reject that saturation is
behind negative peer e¤ects. For proximity, the evidence shows that b is signicantly less than
0, supporting the idea that a saturation e¤ect is present. However, the point estimate for 
remains negative and is statistically signicant. In other words, even if our results are a¤ected
by a saturation e¤ect when we use geographical proximity as network variable, network peer
e¤ects remain signicantly negative even when we account for it. Overall, this evidence indicates
that saturation is not the explanation for our results.
26 It is easy to verify that including the control individuals as well does not a¤ect the results, given the way bPi
is constructed. So control individuals can be ignored.
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8. Concluding remarks
Using a large-scale eld experiment, we have investigated how voter education treatments af-
fected political participation in the 2009 elections in Mozambique. Three types of interventions
were tested: distribution of an independent newspaper; access to a text message hotline; and
a civic education campaign. The interventions are shown to increase voter turnout and the
electoral knowledge of targeted and untargeted individuals in treated locations. Using several
measures of network centrality based on social and geographical connectedness, we estimate
reinforcement and di¤usion network e¤ects. We nd that peer e¤ects on political participation
are consistently negative, i.e., individuals with many connections to other surveyed subjects are
less likely to vote than similar individuals with fewer connections. This is particularly clear for
the hotline treatment. At the same time, interest in politics is positively transmitted across
peers.
We interpret these ndings in the context of a voter participation framework where voter
education can a¤ect information and interest in politics, and, hence, change voter behavior.
We argue that the sign of the network e¤ects suggests free-riding through pivotal reasoning: a
smaller treatment e¤ect on turnout among central individuals results from realizing that the
campaign is driving more people to vote, making their own turnout less essential.
These results have implications for the design of voter education campaigns. While social
networks tend to magnify treatment e¤ects on soft outcomes such as interest in elections, they
can attenuate turnout by circulating information about voting intentions, thereby triggering
free-riding through pivotal reasoning.
9. References
Aker, J., P. Collier, and P. C. Vicente (2016): Is Information Power? Using Cell Phones
and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique,Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming.
Angelucci, M., and G. De Giorgi (2009): Indirect E¤ects of an Aid Program: How Do Cash
Transfers A¤ect IneligiblesConsumption?,American Economic Review, 99(1): 486508.
32
Angelucci, M., G. De Giorgi, M. Rangel, and I. Rasul (2010): Family Networks and School
Enrollment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment, Journal of Public Economics,
94(3-4), 197221.
Baird, S., J. A. Bohren, C. McIntosh, and B. Ozler (2014): "Designing Experiments to
Measure Spillover E¤ects", Penn Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14-006.
Bandiera, O., and I. Rasul (2006): Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern
Mozambique,Economic Journal, 116(514), 862902.
Banerjee, A. V., S. Kumar, R. Pande, and F. Su (2011): Do Informed Voters Make Better
Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India,Harvard University, mimeograph.
Bauer, M., A. Cassar, J. Chytilova, and J. Henrich (2014): Wars Enduring E¤ects on
the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-group Biases,Psychological Science, 25(1),
47-57.
Bramoullé, Y., H. Djebbari, and B. Fortin (2009): "Identication of Peer E¤ects through
Social Networks," Journal of Econometrics, 150(1), 41-55.
Bruhn, M. and D. McKenzie (2009): In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice
in Development Field Experiments,American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(4),
200-32.
Chandrasekhar, A. G., and R. Lewis (2012): Econometrics of Sampled Networks,Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, mimeograph.
Collier, P., and P. C. Vicente (2014): Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment
in Nigeria,Economic Journal, 124(574), F327-355.
Cungara, B., G. Fagilde, J. Garrett, R. N. Uaiene, and D. Headey (2011): Growth Without
Change: The Elusiveness of Agricultural and Economics Transformation in Mozambique,Pa-
per presented at Dialogue on Promoting Agricultural Growth in Mozambique, 21 July 2011.
Available at: http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/mozambique/caadp/
Dale, A., and A. Strauss (2009): Dont Forget to Vote: Text Message Reminders as a
Mobilization Tool,American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), 787804.
De Vletter, F. (2001): Coping with Extreme Poverty through Traditional Skills: The Case
33
of the Xirundzu Basket Makers of Mozambique,International Labour Organization, Southern
African Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (ILO/SAMAT), Discussion Paper No. 18.
Dhillon, A., and S. Peralta (2002): Economic Theories of Voter Turnout,Economic Jour-
nal, 112, F332F352.
Downs, Anthony (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.
Fafchamps, M., and P. C. Vicente (2013): Political Violence and Social Networks: Experi-
mental Evidence from a Nigerian Election,Journal of Development Economics, 101, 27-48.
Feddersen, T. (2004): Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting,Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 18(1): 99-112.
Fujiwara, V., and L. Wantchekon (2013): "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome
Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin," American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics, 5(4), 241-255.
Gerber, A. and D. Green (2000): The E¤ect of a Nonpartisan Get-out-the-Vote Drive: An
Experimental Study,Journal of Politics, 62, 84657.
Gine, X., and G. Mansuri (2011): Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female
Voting Behavior in Pakistan,World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5692.
Kling, J. R., J. B. Liebman, and L. F. Katz (2007): Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood
E¤ects,Econometrica, 75(1), 83119.
Miguel, E., and M. Kremer (2004): Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health
in the Presence of Treatment Externalities,Econometrica, 72(1), 159217.
Manski, Charles F. (1993): Identication of Endogenous Social E¤ects: The Reection
Problem,Review of Economic Studies, 60, 531-42
Montgomery, M. R. and J. B. Casterline (1996): Social Learning, Social Inuence, and
New Models of Fertility,Population and Development Review, 22, Supplement: Fertility in the
United States: New Patterns, New Theories, 151-175.
Myatt, D. P. (2015): A Theory of Voter Turnout,London Business School, mimeograph.
Nickerson, D. W. (2008): Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments,
American Political Science Review, 102(1), 4957.
34
Palfrey, T., and H. Rosenthal (1983): A Strategic Calculus of Voting,Public Choice, 41(1),
7-53.
Palfrey, T., and H. Rosenthal (1985): Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty,Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 79(1), 62-78.
Pop-Eleches, C, H. Thirumurthy, J. P. Habyarimana, J. G. Zivin, M. P. Goldstein, D. De
Walque, L. MacKeen, J. Haberer, S. Kimaiyo, J. Sidle, D. Ngare, D. R. Bangsberg (2011):
Mobile Phone Technologies Improve Adherence to Antiretroviral Treatment in a Resource-
limited Setting: a Randomized Controlled Trial of Text Message Reminders,AIDS, 25, 82534.
Schafer, J. L. and J. W Graham (2002): Missing Data: Our View of the State of the Art,
Psychological Methods, 7(2), 147177.
Sheldon, K. (1999): Machambas in the City: Urban Women and Agricultural Work in
Mozambique,Lusotopie, 121-140.
Thaler, R. H., and C. R. Sunstein (2009): Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth
and Happiness, New York: Penguin Books.
Vaz, A. (2013): Interpersonal Inuence and Network E¤ects on Voting Behavior: Experi-
mental Evidence from Mozambique,D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, mimeograph.
Vicente, P. C. (2014): Is Vote-Buying E¤ective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West
Africa,Economic Journal, 124(574), F356-387.
Wantchekon, L. (2003): Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experi-
ment in Benin,World Politics, 15(3), 399-422.
35
Appendix: Channels of inuence
The purpose of this online appendix is to discuss the di¤erent possible channels of inuence
that could explain our results. A rst possible channel of inuence is that credible information
about the electoral process increases voter condence and induces discouraged voters, namely
opposition supporters, to vote. If this were true, we would expect an increase in information
and interest about the electoral process in treated EAs, as well as a higher share of ballots
going to the opposition. Because information often di¤uses along social networks, we would also
expect positive di¤usion and reinforcement e¤ects.27 Is this narrative supported by the empirical
results? On the positive side, we nd some (limited) e¤ects of the treatments on information
about voting and on in interest in elections. But if anything the treatments have increased
voting for the incumbent and reduced voting for the opposition, and the negative peer e¤ects
we document on turnout are hard to reconcile with this narrative.
A second possibility is that the treatments iname partisan passions and people vote to
support their team. This channel of inuence does not require that people become more
knowledgeable about the details of the electoral process. Since people vote not so much to
a¤ect the electoral outcome but to show support for a party or candidate, it does not matter
if they do not expect to be pivotal voters. We therefore expect treatments to induce high
participation rates and, in a context dominated by the incumbent, more votes for the ruling
party. Because this channel of inuence relies on herding behavior, we expect to observe both
di¤usion and reinforcement e¤ects. More of our ndings are consistent with a support-your-
team e¤ect: namely the limited e¤ects on interest about the elections and the clear average
e¤ect on turnout. Treatments increase voting for the dominant party, a nding that is di¢ cult
to reconcile with the idea that treatment reassured opposition voters to cast their vote. We also
nd that the hotline treatment has the strongest positive e¤ect on turnout among targeted and
untargeted, perhaps because SMS messages about electoral abuse can be used to rally others.
But the negative peer e¤ects are again di¢ cult to reconcile with this narrative.
A third possibility is that our treatments a¤ect voting through social pressure either di-
27See for instance Montgomery and Casterline (1996) on social learning.
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rectly through treatment nudging, or indirectly through peer-to-peer reinforcement and di¤usion
e¤ects. This channel is likely to be most relevant when the act of voting is seen as a civic duty.
Civic education is expected to have the strongest direct treatment e¤ect in this case because it
is focused on nudging. If this is the channel through which treatments increase turnout, we do
not necessarily expect treated individuals to be more knowledgeable about the electoral process,
or to be more interested in the electoral outcome. Some of our ndings are consistent with this
social pressure/civic duty interpretation, notably the robust direct e¤ect of the civic education
treatment on turnout. But once again negative peer e¤ects are di¢ cult to explain with this
narrative.
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Table 1: Average treatment effect on political participation 
   
  
      On targeted individuals   On untargeted individuals 
  
Turnout 
Open letter 
 
Turnout 
Open letter 
  
Index 
 
Index 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.076*** 0.069*** -0.033 -0.030 
 
0.088** 0.097*** 0.006 0.015 
 
standard error (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.049) (0.046) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient -0.043 -0.032 0.119** 0.110** 
 
0.002 0.024 0.051 0.038 
 
standard error (0.030) (0.028) (0.048) (0.049) 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.074) (0.069) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.028 -0.019 0.079* 0.078* 
 
-0.026 -0.002 0.099 0.077 
 
standard error (0.024) (0.024) (0.046) (0.044) 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.077) (0.079) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls 
 
No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes 
Mean dep. variable among controls 0.757 0.756 0.153 0.151 
 
0.757 0.756 0.153 0.151 
R-squared adjusted 
 
0.040 0.069 0.021 0.035 
 
0.035 0.076 0.018 0.040 
No. of observations   953 943 973 962   437 430 449 441 
Note: Regressions (1) to (4) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. Regressions (5) to (8) include 
observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. All regressions 
include fixed effects for randomization cluster.  In the second column of each outcome, we also control for demographic characteristics (sex, age, 
single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, 
chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area) and enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center). 
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
        
Table 2: Average treatment effect on electoral information and interest 
  
  
 
     On targeted individuals   On untargeted individuals 
  
Basic electoral 
information 
Interest in elections 
 
Basic electoral 
information 
Interest in elections 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.161*** 0.186*** 0.123* 0.096 
 
0.198** 0.283*** 0.087 0.043 
 
standard error (0.061) (0.056) (0.073) (0.070) 
 
(0.085) (0.081) (0.104) (0.106) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient -0.020 0.005 -0.123 -0.116 
 
-0.068 -0.099 -0.083 -0.114 
 
standard error (0.059) (0.051) (0.079) (0.076) 
 
(0.109) (0.101) (0.164) (0.171) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.086 -0.004 -0.032 0.000 
 
-0.076 -0.107 -0.087 -0.132 
 
standard error (0.055) (0.050) (0.066) (0.065) 
 
(0.113) (0.100) (0.153) (0.149) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls   No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.006 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.006 
R-squared adjusted 
 
0.095 0.264 0.125 0.159 
 
0.076 0.300 0.176 0.205 
No. of observations   976 965 976 965   453 445 454 446 
Note: Regressions (1) to (4) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. Regressions (5) to (8) include observations for 
untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. The dependent variables are indices 
standardized to have mean 0 and variance 1. All regressions include fixed effects for randomization clusters.  In the second column for each outcome we control 
for demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  domestic worker, household has 
enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area) and enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, 
has a health center). Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
         
 Table 3: Average treatment effect on official electoral results at the ballot-station level       
  
Presidential elections 
 
Parliamentary elections 
  Turnout 
% votes 
for 
Guebuza 
% votes 
for 
Dhlakama 
 Turnout 
% votes 
FRELIMO 
% votes 
RENAMO 
   
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.051** 0.019 -0.010 
 
0.054** 0.017 -0.012 
 
standard error (0.024) (0.020) (0.015) 
 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.015) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient 0.001 0.021 -0.007 
 
-0.000 0.018 -0.009 
 
standard error (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) 
 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.015) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.002 0.022 -0.019 
 
-0.006 0.015 -0.022 
 
standard error (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) 
 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.015) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.440 0.723 0.114 
 
0.438 0.722 0.136 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.412 0.691 0.610 
 
0.393 0.701 0.670 
No. of observations   161 161 161   161 161 161 
Note: Observations include ballot stations in control and treated locations. All regressions are OLS. We control for enumeration area 
characteristics and province dummies. All regressions include fixed effects for randomization clusters. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 4: Network effects on turnout index                
  
On targeted individuals 
 
On untargeted individuals 
  
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
 
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.069** 
 
0.101*** 0.103*** 0.092*** 
 
standard error (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient -0.029 -0.032 -0.046 
 
0.024 0.019 0.022 
 
standard error (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 
 
0.003 0.002 -0.027 
 
standard error (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
Network variable coefficient 0.255*** 0.187** 0.051 
 
0.245*** 0.191** 0.070* 
 
standard error (0.079) (0.081) (0.031) 
 
(0.071) (0.076) (0.040) 
Network x Treatment coefficient -0.220** -0.232** -0.045 
 
-0.363*** -0.344** -0.057 
 
standard error (0.105) (0.106) (0.037) 
 
(0.124) (0.143) (0.057) 
Network x Newspaper coefficient 0.088 0.078 -0.017 
 
0.150 0.149 -0.066 
 
standard error (0.094) (0.109) (0.038) 
 
(0.131) (0.175) (0.067) 
Network x Civic education coefficient 0.080 0.037 -0.008 
 
0.221 0.453** 0.033 
 
standard error (0.106) (0.107) (0.025) 
 
(0.152) (0.182) (0.060) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Magnitude of network effects (a): 
 
  
      
Treatment 
 
-0.049** -0.027** -0.055 
 
-0.080*** -0.037** -0.067 
   Newspaper 
 
0.019 0.009 -0.020 
 
0.033 0.016 -0.078 
   Civic education   0.018 0.004 -0.010   0.048 0.048** 0.039 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.756 0.756 0.755 
 
0.756 0.756 0.755 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.080 0.069 0.073 
 
0.089 0.078 0.082 
No. of observations 
 
943 943 800 
 
430 430 364 
Note: Regressions (1) to (3) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents; regressions (4) to (6) include 
observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. In 
addition to fixed effects for randomization clusters, we control for demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail 
informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue 
language, time living in the enumeration area), enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center) and province 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
(a) For chatting and kinship, the  reported network effect is the difference in average treatment effect between an individual with an 
average size network and an individual with no network at all. For geographical proximity, the reported network effect is the difference in 
average treatment effect between an individual with maximum (i.e., zero) proximity and an individual with average proximity.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5: Network effects on posting the open letter             
  
On targeted individuals 
 
On untargeted individuals 
  
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
 
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment dummy coefficient -0.030 -0.032 -0.022 
 
0.011 0.001 -0.019 
 
standard error (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.051) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient 0.109** 0.110** 0.103** 
 
0.043 0.063 0.052 
 
standard error (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) 
 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.070) 
Civic education dummy coefficient 0.079* 0.078* 0.071 
 
0.076 0.071 0.127 
 
standard error (0.044) (0.044) (0.048) 
 
(0.079) (0.075) (0.092) 
Network coefficient -0.012 0.026 0.013 
 
0.044 0.089 0.079** 
 
standard error (0.118) (0.150) (0.034) 
 
(0.111) (0.148) (0.037) 
Network x Treatment coefficient 0.150 -0.066 0.027 
 
0.083 0.240 0.034 
 
standard error (0.158) (0.219) (0.043) 
 
(0.223) (0.249) (0.066) 
Network x Newspaper coefficient -0.163 0.022 -0.031 
 
0.082 0.058 0.063 
 
standard error (0.156) (0.201) (0.060) 
 
(0.297) (0.473) (0.094) 
Network x Civic education coefficient -0.254* -0.196 0.039 
 
-0.413 -1.096*** -0.051 
 
standard error (0.140) (0.176) (0.047) 
 
(0.263) (0.369) (0.128) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Controls   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Magnitude of network effects (a): 
        
   Treatment 
 
0.033 -0.008 0.032 
 
0.018 0.026 0.040 
   Newspaper 
 
-0.036 0.003 -0.038 
 
0.018 0.006 0.075 
   Civic education   -0.056* -0.023 0.047   -0.091 -0.120*** -0.061 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.151 0.151 0.158 
 
0.151 0.151 0.158 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.034 0.034 0.037 
 
0.038 0.049 0.043 
No. of observations 
 
962 962 817 
 
441 441 373 
Note: Regressions (1) to (3) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents; regressions (4) to (6) include 
observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. We 
control for demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  
domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area), 
enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center) and province dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level.  
(a) For chatting and kinship, the reported network effect is the difference in average treatment effect between an individual with an 
average size network and an individual with no network at all. For geographical proximity, the reported network effect is the difference in 
average treatment effect between an individual with maximum (i.e., zero) proximity and an individual with average proximity.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6: Network effects on the electoral information index           
  
On targeted individuals 
 
On untargeted individuals 
  
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
 
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.144** 
 
0.297*** 0.298*** 0.257*** 
 
standard error (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) 
 
(0.078) (0.080) (0.089) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient 0.007 0.006 0.018 
 
-0.111 -0.120 -0.066 
 
standard error (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
 
(0.100) (0.102) (0.114) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.003 -0.002 0.013 
 
-0.113 -0.111 -0.065 
 
standard error (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) 
 
(0.098) (0.100) (0.106) 
Network coefficient -0.098 -0.394* -0.000 
 
-0.044 -0.382 0.021 
 
standard error (0.196) (0.234) (0.062) 
 
(0.222) (0.234) (0.069) 
Network x Treatment coefficient 0.124 0.484* 0.092 
 
-0.283 -0.003 0.079 
 
standard error (0.255) (0.290) (0.075) 
 
(0.407) (0.415) (0.125) 
Network x Newspaper coefficient 0.132 0.090 -0.144** 
 
0.294 0.183 -0.126 
 
standard error (0.242) (0.291) (0.071) 
 
(0.438) (0.607) (0.175) 
Network x Civic education coefficient -0.098 -0.391* -0.118* 
 
0.604 0.818* -0.173 
 
standard error (0.203) (0.218) (0.062) 
 
(0.443) (0.463) (0.157) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Controls   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Magnitude of network effects (a): 
        
   Treatment 
 
0.027 0.056* 0.113 
 
-0.063 0.000 0.093 
   Newspaper 
 
0.029 0.010 -0.176** 
 
0.065 0.020 -0.149 
   Civic education   -0.022 -0.045* -0.143*   0.133 0.089* -0.205 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.000 0.000 0.009 
 
0.000 0.000 0.009 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.262 0.268 0.271 
 
0.295 0.302 0.297 
No. of observations 
 
965 965 820 
 
445 445 377 
Note: Regressions (1) to (3) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents; regressions (4) to (5) include 
observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. We 
control for demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  
domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area), 
enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center) and province dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level.  
(a) For chatting and kinship, the reported network effect is the difference in average treatment effect between an individual with an 
average size network and an individual with no network at all. For geographical proximity, the reported network effect is the difference in 
average treatment effect between an individual with maximum (i.e., zero) proximity and an individual with average proximity.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 7: Network effects on the index of interest in elections           
  
On targeted individuals 
 
On untargeted individuals 
  
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
 
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment dummy coefficient 0.105 0.100 0.118 
 
0.056 0.055 0.063 
 
standard error (0.069) (0.068) (0.079) 
 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.121) 
Newspaper dummy coefficient -0.108 -0.114 -0.145* 
 
-0.116 -0.084 -0.198 
 
standard error (0.078) (0.076) (0.085) 
 
(0.165) (0.164) (0.187) 
Civic education dummy coefficient -0.001 0.005 0.018 
 
-0.131 -0.147 -0.064 
 
standard error (0.066) (0.065) (0.072) 
 
(0.145) (0.154) (0.167) 
Network coefficient -0.225 -0.360 0.158** 
 
-0.197 -0.138 0.089 
 
standard error (0.170) (0.252) (0.069) 
 
(0.173) (0.313) (0.074) 
Network x Treatment coefficient 0.539** 0.664* -0.096 
 
0.077 0.057 -0.132 
 
standard error (0.228) (0.352) (0.128) 
 
(0.437) (0.686) (0.201) 
Network x Newspaper coefficient 0.409 0.290 -0.052 
 
1.267** 1.640* 0.502* 
 
standard error (0.291) (0.416) (0.136) 
 
(0.592) (0.851) (0.270) 
Network x Civic education coefficient -0.011 -0.548 -0.090 
 
0.610 -0.342 0.191 
 
standard error (0.228) (0.383) (0.121) 
 
(0.556) (0.972) (0.225) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Controls   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Magnitude of network effects (a): 
        
   Treatment 
 
0.118** 0.077* -0.117 
 
0.017 0.006 -0.155 
   Newspaper 
 
0.089 0.034 -0.064 
 
0.279** 0.178* 0.593* 
   Civic education   -0.002 -0.063 -0.110   0.134 -0.037 0.226 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.006 0.006 -0.011 
 
0.006 0.006 -0.011 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.169 0.164 0.141 
 
0.222 0.219 0.233 
No. of observations 
 
965 965 820 
 
446 446 378 
Note: Regressions (1) to (3) include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents; regressions (4) to (6) include 
observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. We control 
for demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  domestic 
worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area), enumeration 
area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center) and province dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.  
(a) For chatting and kinship, the reported network effect is the difference in average treatment effect between an individual with an average size 
network and an individual with no network at all. For geographical proximity, the reported network effect is the difference in average treatment 
effect between an individual with maximum (i.e., zero) proximity and an individual with average proximity.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8: Treatment effect on turnout index by 2004 win gap and turnout  
  
Win gap Turnout 
    (1) (2) 
Treatment coefficient 0.074*** 0.067*** 
 
standard 
error 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Newspaper coefficient -0.031 -0.031 
 
standard 
error 
(0.028) (0.027) 
Civic education coefficient -0.018 -0.022 
 
standard 
error 
(0.025) (0.024) 
2004 turnout/win gap between Frelimo and Renamo coefficient -0.036* -0.172 
standard 
error 
(0.021) (0.133) 
2004 win gap/turnout x Treatment coefficient 0.047* 0.003 
 
standard 
error 
(0.027) (0.162) 
2004 win gap/turnout x Newspaper coefficient 0.010 0.272 
 
standard 
error 
(0.028) (0.208) 
2004 win gap/turnout x Civic education coefficient -0.018 0.019 
 
standard 
error 
(0.025) (0.178) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
Controls   Yes Yes 
Mean dep. variable among controls 
 
0.756 0.756 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.070 0.069 
No. of observations 
 
943 943 
Note: Regressions include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. 
All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. We control for demographic characteristics 
(sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher,  
domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, 
time living in the enumeration area), enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health 
center) and province dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. The win 
gap is the difference in 2004 vote shares between the Frelimo and Renamo presidential candidates at 
the EA level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 9: Network effects on turnout index, controlling for turnout by peers 
  
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Average turnout of peers coefficient -0.858*** -1.086*** -1.042*** 
 
standard error (0.288) (0.187) (0.259) 
% of my peers who were treated coefficient -0.129 -0.091 -0.250** 
 
standard error (0.089) (0.080) (0.098) 
% of EA sample who are my peers coefficient 0.806*** 1.050*** -0.490** 
 
standard error (0.224) (0.156) (0.195) 
Untargeted dummy coefficient 0.025 0.026 0.017 
 
standard error (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
Intercept coefficient 0.744*** 0.733*** 0.806*** 
 
standard error (0.039) (0.038) (0.050) 
Randomization cluster fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls   Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.034 0.058 0.175 
No. of observations   1,106 1,106 1,106 
Note: Regressions include observations on respondents in control and treated villages. All regressions 
are OLS and use second-round data. We control for EA fixed effects as well as demographic 
characteristics (sex, age, single, divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, 
teacher,  domestic worker, household has enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue 
language, time living in the enumeration area). Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area 
level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 Table 10: Testing for saturation           
   
Chatting Kinship Proximity 
    
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted turnout index without treatment coefficient   1.025*** 1.045*** 0.869*** 
 
bootstrapped standard error (0.033) (0.039) (0.057) 
Network coefficient 
 
-0.178 -0.136 -0.074** 
 
bootstrapped standard error (0.111) (0.108) (0.035) 
Test propensity to vote = 1 chi2(1)   0.610  1.310  5.280** 
  p-value   0.434  0.252  0.022  
No. of observations (including those to predict propensity to vote) 1,106 1,106 1,106 
Note: Reported regressions only include observations from treated villages in the second-round data, including 
targeted and untargeted. All regressions are OLS without constant term and the dependent variable is the turnout 
index minus the average treatment effect (see text for details). Predicted propensity to vote in control villages is 
obtained by linearly regressing turnout index on network size, demographic characteristics (sex, age, single, 
divorced, protestant, retail informal sector, commerce, professional, teacher, domestic worker, household has 
enough food, owned house, chitsua ethnic group, lomue language, time living in the enumeration area), 
enumeration area characteristics (has a post office, has a health center) and province dummies. Since the predicted 
propensity to vote already captures the effect of these regressors on turnout, they are omitted from the above 
regressions. Standard errors are obtained using bootstrapping to simulate the distribution of estimated coefficients 
resulting from this two-step approach. More specifically, we re-estimate the predicting regression multiple times 
by sampling with replacement from the control observations. We do the same for the average treatment effect. For 
each set of predicted variables obtained in this manner, we re-estimate the regression reported here by sampling 
with replacement from the treated population. 500 replications are used to produce the reported standard errors. In 
order to allow for interdependence of errors within EAs, resampling is done over EAs. See text for more details. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
   
 
